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This paper studies the importance of incentives as a determinant of international trade
flows. We argue that barter, countertrade and foreign direct investment can be seen as
efficient institutions that mitigate contractual hazards which arise in technology trade,
marketing and imperfect capital markets. Paying an import with export goods rather than
cash (barter) helps to overcome incentive problems that arise in debt repayment of highly
indebted countries. Payment in export goods removes the anonymity of the medium of
exchange and thus allows to create a collateral for the creditor. Furthermore, tying an
import with an export (countertrade) helps to solve the incentive problems related to the
technology transfer to developing countries. The export flow serves as a "hostage" that
deters cheating on the quality of the imported technology good. The predictions of the
two models are consistent with the pattern of trade of actual barter and countertrade
contracts.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ökonomische Anreize und internationaler Handel
Diese Studie untersucht die Bedeutung von ökonomischen Anreizen als Bestimmungs-
größe internationaler Handelsflüsse. Wir argumentieren, daß ausländische Direktinvesti-
tionen, Joint Ventures, der Barterhandel und Kompensationsgeschäfte als effiziente Insti-
tutionen angesehen werden können, die Anreizprobleme vermeiden helfen, die bei dem
Technologiehandel, bei der Vermarktung neuer Produkte und auf unvollkommenen Kapi-
talmärkten auftreten. Die Bezahlung eines Imports mit Exportgütern, statt mit Geld
(Barter), hilft, Anreizprobleme zu überwinden, die in hochverschuldeten Ländern bei der
Schuldentilgung auftreten. Die Zahlung mit Gütern hebt die Anonymität des Tausch-
mediums auf und erlaubt somit dem Gläubiger eine Sicherheit für seinen Kredit zu schaf-
fen. Die Verknüpfung eines Imports mit einem Export (Countertrade) hilft die Anreiz-
probleme zu überwinden, die mit dem Technologietransfer in Entwicklungsländer ver-
bunden sind. Das Exportgeschäft dient als "Geisel" im Sinne von O. Williamson, die dazu
dient, Betrugsanreize im Importgeschäft bei der Lieferung der Technologie abzu-
schrecken. Dadurch kann Countertrade als ein erst-bestes Substitut für eine ausländische
Direktinvestition angesehen werden, bei der die Anreizprobleme bei der Technologie-
lieferung durch eine firmeninterne Organisation gelöst werden. Die Voraussagen beider
Modelle sind konsistent mit den Spezialisierungsmuster des Barter- und Countertrade-
Handels.
                                               
*  Paper prepared for the Session "Trade, Rules and Institutions" at the European Economic
Association Congress, Toulouse, 1997. We thank Thierry Verdier for helpful comments.1 Introduction
Economic incentives and institutions as a determinant of trade have received relatively
little attention from traditional trade theory. The main reason for this neglect seems to be
that contract theory and the theory of international trade belong to two strands of the
literature with separate traditions. In this paper we argue that there is much to be gained
by merging these two fields. Incentives and economic institutions can play an important
role in explaining international trade beyond the known determinants of trade like factor
endowment, productivity, preferences, and market structure. They are particularly
relevant for the explanations of international business activities such as foreign direct
investment, joint ventures, alliances, barter, countertrade and other forms of international
partnership, the so-called „new forms of international business“.
1
Table 1 illustrates with the example of East-West trade that trade takes a variety of
different institutional forms. At one end of the spectrum there are spot transactions like
conventional exports and imports, at the other end common ownership like joint ventures
and foreign direct investment. Tying contracts like international barter and countertrade
take a middle position. In a typical barter and countertrade transaction a firm or a trade
organization in eastern Europe (or a developing country) imports from a developed
country and commits itself to export goods to this country in return. Thus, barter and
countertrade are market transactions which bind the parties together.
Why do we observe these different contracts form in international trade? Some
experts have argued that in particular barter and countertrade are an outcome of central
planning. Due to a political ownership constraint, joint ventures and foreign direct
investment were rare before 1989 and started to grow only since then.
2 But as Table 1
shows, although barter and countertrade declined in some countries (like theCzech
Republic, Poland and Hungary) their importance increased in others (like the former
Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania). Barter also regained importance in domestic trade
in most of the former Soviet Union.
3 Furthermore, the same institutional arrangements
can be found in trade with developing countries.
4 An alternative explanation is therefore
warranted. We instead see these forms as institutional arrangements which promote
efficient international exchange when parties have short run temptations to cheat and
when alternative mechanisms, e.g. based on repeated interaction, fail to be effective.
                                               
1  Oman (1984).
2  See also Lankes and Venables (1996).
3  Estimates suggest that in the Ukraine 43 percent of exports and 50 to 70 percent of domestic trade
took the form of barter in 1994. Estimates of similar size are given for Russia and Kazakhstan.
4  See OECD (1981) and (1985).2
Formal institutions are therefore required to substitute for informal arrangements such as
reputation.
5
Table 1: The Institutional Structure of East-West Trade
Exports Barter Joint Ventures
Imports Countertrade
1 Foreign Direct Investment
2
before 1989 ~ 60 % ~ 40 % 0 %
after 1989 1990 1995 1990 1995
Hungary 3.6% 22.7%
Poland 0.4% 8.6%
Czech Republic 1.2% 12.0%
Slovakia 0.6% 2.9%
Russia ~ 50% 1.6% 4.3%
Romania ~ 10% ~  6% 1.2% 4.0%
Bulgaria 0.9% 2.7%
Ukraine ~ 50% ~ 20%
3
Source: World Investment Report 1994 and 1996; Countries in transition 1996. The Vienna Institute for
Comparative economic Studies; OECD: East West Trade: Recent Developments in
Countertrade 1981.
1 Percentage of total trade.
2 Incoming foreign direct investments as a ratio of total imports of the respectibe country.
3 1996
In this paper we focus on barter and countertrade to analyse the role of formal
institutions which govern international trade. Two stylized facts on countertrade and
barter stand out that need to be explained. First, they tend to take place in countries
which are highly indebted. The debt to GDP ratio of countertrading countries varies
between 4.5% and 327%. Second, the trade pattern within barter and countertrade
                                               
5  Bulow and Rogoff (1989) show that reputation as an enforcement fails to be effective an
international capital markets when the debtor can costless switch to cash in advance contracts. In a
notable paper, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) analyse merchant gilds in the middle ages as
an efficiency enhancing institution to deal with moral hazard problems in international trade when
a reputation mechanism cannot solve these incentive problems. For an overview of other
institutions governing international trade in the Commercial Revolution see Greif (1992). For an
institutional approach to the form of trade liberalization see Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992).3
differs significantly form that in conventional trade. Table 2 illustrates this on the
example of East-West trade. Within countertrade and barter more than 70% of Eastern
European imports from the OECD are machinery and equipment compared to 36% in
conventional imports. On the export side, Eastern Europe’s exports to the OECD consist
of 36% machinery and equipment and 32% consumer goods within countertrade, while
the same categories account for only 18% and 16%, respectively, in conventional
exports.
Table 2 - Pattern of Trade with Eastern Europe in 1987





2 Countertrade Total Trade
2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Machinery and Equipment 70.9 35.7 35.5 17.7







Services 4.0 n.a. 6.0 n.a.
Foods and agricultural products 10.4 10.9
Source: Sample of 230 countertrade contracts; Comecon Data 1989. The Vienna Institute for
Comparative Economic Studies, Vienna.
1 The percentages of column 1 and 3 refer to the total of 230 countertrade contracts of the
sample. The percentages of column 2 and 4 refer to total imports and exports of Eastern
Europe. Eastern Europe is here defined as to consist of Poland, Hungary, Tschechoslovakia, and
the Soviet Union. These four countries cover more than 60 percent of the 230 countertrade
contracts of the sample. The four countries enter with the following respective weights: 0.115,
0.235, 0.407 and 0.243. These weights correspond to the importance of the respective country
in the countertrade sample.
2 This column gives the CMEA Classification of commodity groups called CMEA Trade
Nomenclature (CTN):CTN1 machinery and equipment, CTN9 consumer goods, CTN2-5 basic
goods and CTN6-8 food and agricultural products.
3 Includes chemical products also.
4 Includes food and agricultural products also.
Barter and countertrade are typically criticized for their inefficiency because of their
reciprocity features and the need of a double coincidence of wants. We therefore ask two
questions. First, why would parties want to tie an import with an export (countertrade)?4
Second, in a fully developed monetary world economy why would parties agree to pay in
goods rather than money (barter)? The answer that we give in this paper is that by doing
so the trade partners can solve incentive problems which otherwise would prevent trade
from taking place at all. In section 2 we show that paying with goods rather than money
helps to overcome the creditworthiness problem of highly indebted countries. In section
3 we focus on the import pattern of countertrade and show that countertrade promotes
efficient technology transfer and thus is a first best substitute for common ownership like
foreign direct investment. In section4 we derive the export pattern of barter by
identifying which goods will qualify as means of payment.
2. The institutional organization of trade
Consider two potential trade partners, A, a firm in a Western country, and B, a firm in an
Eastern European or developing country. B would like to buy one unit of good 1 from A
but since he is short of foreign exchange he cannot pay when good 1 is delivered. One
period later, B can produce and sell one unit of good 2 on the world market to generate
sufficient revenues to pay for good 1. The problem is, however, that A cannot enforce
this payment unless B provides a collateral that A can seize in case of repudiation. Assets
in B’s country cannot serve as collaterals since in case of conflict A depends on the
cooperation of B’s country to enforce her claim on these assets. Thus, B’s
creditworthiness depends on his ability to provide collaterals that are in A’s reach if he
should refuse payment. In the remainder of this paper we will focus on the case where B
is highly indebted already, so that almost no collaterals are left for additional transactions
like buying good 1 on a credit basis.
To make ideas precise let v1 denote B’s valuation of good 1 and c1 denote A’s
production cost. B’s revenues from selling goods2 on the world market are given by v2
and his production costs are c2. Finally, a represents the amount of collateral that B has
left to guarantee future payments. We assume that v1 > c1, v2 > c2  and v2 > c1, i.e. both
transactions are potentially profitable and B’s revenues from selling good 2 are sufficient
to cover A’s productions cost for good 1 (we assume that there is no discounting).
However, a < c1, i.e. if A sells good 1 on a credit basis she cannot insure a repayment
sufficiently high to recover her production cost. Thus, a conventional trade cannot take
place because B cannot guarantee that he will pay for good 1 once he has sufficient funds
available.
Suppose now that instead of selling good 2 himself B promises to deliver good 2 to
A as payment of good 1. Why should this make any difference to A? the point is that in
case of such a barter contract A acquires property rights on good 2 which can now serve
as an additional deal-specific collateral. If B should try to cheat on A and sell good 2 on5
the world market instead of delivering it to A as specified in the barter contract A can ask
courts to intervene. In this case B’s expected payoff from going to the world market is
reduced to p2 £ (v2 - c2). Thus, B voluntarily delivers good 2 to A if and only if
v1 - c2 ‡ v1 - a + p2. (1)
On the other hand, A is willing to deliver good 1 to B if and only if condition (1) is
satisfied and in addition
v2 -c1 ‡ 0. (2)
Proposition 1 Barter trade can overcome B’s lack of creditworthiness of and only if
v2 ‡ c1 - a + c2 + p2. (3)
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 1 shows that the moral hazard problem of debt repayment can be solved
only if the problem of creditworthiness is not too severe; i. e. a is not too small, if the
deal-specific collateral v2 is sufficiently large, and if p2 is sufficiently small, i.e. if A can
successfully label good 2 as her property.
6 The advantage of paying with goods rather
than money is that goods are less anonymous than money and thus they can be
earmarked as property of the creditor. If A could not label and identify good 2 as her
own collateral in case of conflict, nothing could keep B from selling it to someone else.
But since goods act like special purpose money they are better collaterals than cash.
7
So far we have implicitly assumed that good 2 is homogeneous like basic goods and
commodities. This means in particular that it involves no quality problem. If good 2 is
instead differentiated like consumer and investment goods an additional incentive
problem arise, because B may deliver low quality. This tends to make differentiated
goods less liquid than homogeneous products.
To capture this idea suppose that there are just two quality levels, high and low,
land that product quality is not verifiable. With high quality, the production cost of good
2 are c2 and the valuation is v2, with low quality, both production cost and valuation are
normalized to 0. Since A cannot verify the product quality B is tempted to fulfill his
payment obligations at no cost by delivering a low quality good 2. If this happens, A
cannot even claim collateral a even though good 2 is worthless to her.
                                               
6  See Marin and Schnitzer (1997) for a discussion how this relates to the literature on sovereign
debt.
7  For the use of countertrade goods as collaterals see Marin and Schnitzer (1995, 1997) and the
references cited there.6
This problem, is particularly acute if B has not sold this good before and thus
potential customers have no experience with it. One possible solution is that A invests in
the marketing of good 2 on the world market to make new consumers learn about B’s
product and product quality. As a result, B experiences a positive spillovers on his future
export revenues of he delivers good quality now. Let b denote B’s future gain if A makes
a marketing investment i and B delivers high quality. Then B prefers to deliver high
quality to low quality if and only if
v1 + b - c2 ‡  v1, (4)
and he prefers to deliver high quality rather than not to deliver at all if and only if
v1 + b - c2 ‡  v1 - a + p2 (5)
Note that (4) implies (5) if a ‡  p2. A will deliver good 1 and carry out the necessary
marketing investment i for good 2 if and only if
v2 - c1 - i ‡  0. (6)
Proposition 2 If differentiated goods are chosen to collateralize B’s future payment
barter trade can restore B’s creditworthiness if and only if
v2 - c1 - i ‡  0 ‡ c2 - b - min(0; a- p2).  (7)
Homogeneous and differentiated goods differ in two dimensions, in their liquidity and
(potentially) in their anonymity. Differentiated goods are less liquid than homogeneous
products because of the uncertainty about product quality. But they also have the
advantage that B can be given an additional incentive to fulfill his concentrated obligation
by helping him to market goods that otherwise are difficult to export. In addition,
differentiated goods van be made even less anonymous with A’s marketing investment
which again improves their property as a collateral.
8
3.   The import pattern
In this section we focus on the question why it might be desirable to tie an import with
an export. So far we have assumed that good 1 is homogeneous and no incentive
problem on A’s side arises in this transaction. But as Table 1 shows most imports to EE
or LDCs within countertrade consist of technology and machinery where similar quality
problems are present. Since it is often difficult for B to verify the quality of technology
                                               
8  An empirical analysis how different types of goods can be ranked with respect to their liquidity and
anonymity can be found in Marin and Schnitzer (1997).7
goods he cannot legally condition his payment on A’s quality choice. This means that A
has low-powered incentives to deliver high quality technology in the first place. This
phenomenon has become known as the problem of technology transfer to developing
countries.
To illustrate this suppose that A can deliver two different quality levels but B
cannot verify this quality on delivery. We normalize values such that if high quality is
delivered, B’s valuation is v1 and A’s production cost are c1, with v1 >  c1. If low quality
is delivered both production cost and B’s valuation are zero. Suppose furthermore that
the B agrees to pay good 1 by delivering a differentiated good as described in the
previous section.
The following argument shows how a countertrade contract can induce A to deliver
high quality. The idea is to make B’s payment contingent on A’s quality choice in the
sense that if A delivers low quality technology, B will not be able to produce good 2
because he cannot generate enough revenues from the technology and thus has not
enough funds to purchase the inputs required for the production of good 2. Thus, if A
cheats on quality she loses her collateral. Although good 1 and 2 are not technologically
related the countertrade contract establishes a financial link. In order for B to hit a
financial constraint in case of bad quality we need the following two conditions.
a + v1 - c2 ‡  0 (8)
a - c2 £ 0 (9)
Condition (8) on the one hand insures that B can finance good 2 of his revenues from
using good 1 and potentially collateral a. Condition (9) on the other hand implies that B
cannot finance good 2 out of this collateral a alone and thus cannot produce and deliver
good 2 if low quality technology is delivered.
9 Recall that conditions (4) and (5) above
make sure that B delivers a high quality product as payment for good 1 if he is able to do
so. A in turn is willing to deliver high quality (and make the relevant marketing
investment) if and only if condition (6) is satisfied.
Proposition 3 Countertrade can induce an efficient technology transfer and restore
B’s creditworthiness if only if
(i)      v1 - c1 + v2 - c2 + a ‡  i,
(ii)    b ‡  c2 ‡  a,
(iii)  b ‡  p2
(iv)  v2 + b - c2 - i ‡  max{0, p2 - a} + c1.
Proof: See Appendix.
                                               
9  Note that b cannot be used as collateral because it is an unverifiable spillover benefit that cannot be
seized by potential creditors.8
Proposition 3 proves that a market transaction, if embedded in a countertrade
arrangement, can achieve an efficient technology transfer and is thus a first best
substitute for a hierarchical solution like foreign direct investment. The point is that the
export flow serves as a hostage in the sense of Williamson (1983) which deters cheating
on the import of technology good because if A cheats she loses her collateral.
10
Conditions (i) to (iv) imply that for this construction to work the hostage has to be
sufficiently valuable, measured by (v2 + b - c2), compared to the gains from cheating as
measured by c1 and p2. Our contractual solution to A’s moral hazard problem uses the
fact that B faces a financial constraint. If B were able to produce good 2 all by himself,
independent of what A delivers, then condition (9) could not be satisfied and A could not
internalize her own quality decision. Thus, the fact that barter is used by countries with a
severe financial constraint makes it particularly effective to solve the problem of
technology transfer.
11
4.  The export pattern
In this section we ask which goods are chosen as collateral, i.e. what determines the
pattern of exports in barter trade. Trade theory predicts that the trade pattern of a
particular country is determined by its comparative advantage. This implies that B should
use the goods as payment which yield the highest possible surplus, i.e. in which B’s
country has comparative advantage. Even if there is a bilateral monopoly situation as in
our case, the Coase Theorem still predicts that in the absence of transaction costs A and
B choose the most efficient product as collateral. However, the incentive problems
considered in this paper my make this impossible.
We have seen that in order to solve B’s creditworthiness problem it is important to
make sure that B voluntarily delivers goods 2 and, if it is differentiated, that it is of high
quality. This suggests (and is proved formally in the appendix) that homogeneous goods
are preferable as means of payment in barter since they involve no additional quality
problem. But our analysis in the previous section also suggests that differentiated
products are to be preferred as „hostage“ for A’s technology since a positive marketing
benefit b is required to achieve an efficient technology transfer (see condition (ii) of
Proposition 3) because it makes it easier to provide incentives for B to deliver good 2
without violating his financial constraint. We expect these incentive problems to be
                                               
10  Parsons (1985, 1987) and Chan and Hoy (1991) have argued that countertrade can mitigate the
technology transfer problem if the export good is produced directly with the technology imported.
Our solution, however, does not require such a technological link between the two trade flows.
11  A more extensive analysis including also renegotiation can be found in Marin and Schnitzer
(1995).9
reflected in the pattern of exports in barter. Our theory predicts that countries which
differ in their creditworthiness will show a different pattern of barter trade. More
specifically, countries with low creditworthiness will use more liquid goods, i.e.
homogeneous goods as means of payment for their imports, while countries more
concerned about technology transfer will use differentiated goods to collateralize their
future payment.
Table 3 - Creditworthiness and trade pattern
Barter exports Debt/GDP
in percent mean std. dev. no of cases
Eastern Europe
1 86.2 33.8 26.4 194
Export pattern
3
Investment goods 38.7 28.8 24.1 75
Consumer goods 35.6 38.3 28.6 69
Basic goods 13.4 34.4 26.3 26
Chemicals 7.2 33.4 22.9 14
Services 5.2 42.8 30.4 10
Developing countries
2 13.8 76.6 72.1 27
Export pattern
4
Consumer goods 22.2 51.4 33.4   6
Basic goods 51.9 97.1 81.2 14
Chemicals 25.9 57.4 72.6   7
Total 39.1 37.7 221
ANOVA F=35.2, marginal signifiance 0.000
1 Former Soviet Union, former GDR, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, former
Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania.
2 Brazil, Ecuador, Argentinia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, China, Israel,
Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Cyprus, Togo, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
3 The percentages in the first column refer to total barter exports from Eastern Europe.
4 The percentages in the first column refer to total barter exports from LDCs.10
We confront this prediction with data on 230 countertrade and barter contracts in
Table 3 where we examine (with an analysis of variance ANOVA) whether developing
countries and Eastern European countries show a different pattern of specialization.
12
This is indeed supported by the data. Developing countries with an average debt to GDP
ratio of 76.6 are substantially less creditworthy than Eastern Europe with an average
debt to GDP ratio of 33.8 in 1987. Moreover, under central planning, when the system
prohibited foreign ownership of assets, Eastern Europe was much more concerned about
achieving an efficient technology transfer than the developing countries with no such
political ownership constraint on foreign assets. Table 3 confirms that developing
countries use predominately the most liquid good, basic goods, as means of payment in
barter. In contrast, Eastern Europe with its better creditworthiness and concern about
technology transfer uses differentiated goods like consumer and investment goods as
means of payment in barter. Payments in consumer goods provided a sufficiently valuable
hostage to deter cheating on the technology imports.
                                               
12  For details on this data set see Marin (1990).11
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The necessity of (3) is straightforward to see. To prove its
sufficiency note that (2) is satisfied by assumption. The only possible problem thus is that
condition is violated, i.e.
c2 + p2  - a > 0. (10)
If this were the case A could induce B to deliver good 2 by making a voluntary monetary
side payment s conditional on B’s delivery. As long as (3) holds it is possible to find a
side payment such that
v2 - c1 - s ‡ 0 ‡ c2 + p2  - a -s  (11)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: To prove necessity, note that condition (i) is implied by (8)
together with (6), condition (ii) by (9) together with (4), condition (iii) by (9) together
with (5), and condition (iv) by (6) together with (4) and (5), respectively. To prove
sufficiency, note further that (i) ensures that (8) and (6) can be fulfilled, possibly by
making a side payment s such that a + v1 - c2 + s ‡  0 ‡  c1 + i - v2 + s. Furthermore, (ii)
guarantees that (9) and (4) are satisfied. Finally, (iii) ensures that (5) can be satisfied,
possibly by making a side payment s from A to B in case of delivery such that
b - c2 + a - p2 + s ‡  0 ‡  a - c2 + s.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 The creditworthiness problem creates a bias towards choosing
homogeneous goods as collateral in the following sense:
a)  If a homogeneous good is more efficient than a differentiated good and the
differentiated good fulfills all incentive constraints, then the homogeneous good does
so too.
b)  If a differentiated good is more efficient than a homogeneous good and the
homogeneous good fulfills all incentive constraints, it is possible that the
differentiated goods does not and thus cannot serve as a collateral.
Proof: To prove part (b) consider the following example. Suppose first that the
differentiated good is more efficient than the homogeneous one in the sense that
v c b i
d d
2 2 - + -  > v c
h h
2 2 - . Suppose further that  a - p2 > c
h
2   but that b < c
d
2 . Then the
incentive constraint for homogeneous goods, (1), is satisfied but not for differentiated
goods, (4). Since quality is nonverifiable A cannot induce B to deliver high quality by12
promising an additional side payment in case of high quality. Thus, it is not possible to
use the differentiated good as a collateral even though it is more efficient.
To prove part (a) suppose that the homogeneous good is more efficient and that the
incentive constraint for differentiated goods (4) and (5) are fulfilled. Since condition (7)
for differentiated goods is more restrictive than condition (3) for homogeneous goods
this implies that the incentive constraint for homogeneous goods, (1), can be satisfied
too, if necessary by offering an additional side payment to B in case of the (verifiable)
delivery of good 2.
Q.E.D.13
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